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When Is Killing the Unborn
a Homicidal Action?
Patrick Coffey, Ph.D .
Dr. Coffey is Assisant Professor of Philosophy at Marquette
Uni versity in Milwaukee.
It is well known that many
" pro-lifers" believe any killing of
unborn life from fertilization onward to be a homicidal action.
The strongest argument that has
been made in support of this belief is based upon a philosophical
concept of human life which is
rooted in a metaphysics of existence and derived from an analysis
of undisputed instances of human
life, adult human beings. I In this
concept all the proper functions
of a human adult-cognition, sensation, volition, affection, and
vegetation - exist through a unified dynamic tendential act. This
existential act is the adult's basic
intrinsic principle of being. He
exists through it, rather than not
at all, and through it he is oriented to function as humans do,
rather than as some other kind
of thing. The human life of any
adult began (understanding life
in the ontological and most complete sense) when his basic existential principle first came into
being. Thus any act of killing
which excises from the world an
entity existing through this t ype
of human principle, regardless of
the fulfillment or development
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achieved, is a homicidal action in
the moral sense of the term,
which gives one good reason why
it should be considered homicidal
in a valid legal institution.
Many "pro-lifers" insist that
any killing of unborn human life
from fertilization onward is a
homicidal action, then, because
sufficient reasons exist for designating that process as the time
when an adult's principle of existence first came into being. Obviously, they argue, there is no
good reason for locating the principle's beginning in something
prior to fertilization, since no
adult is known to have come from
a male sperm or female ovum
alone. Secondly, there is no compelling reason for designating the
beginning at some point or time
after fertilization. This is true,
the argument continues, because
there is at least a prima fac e continuity in any adult's life from
fertilization to the present moment, and no sufficient logical or
empirical difficulties exist which
make it unreasonable to claim
that the basic human life of any
adult began at fertilization .
This line of argument, however, has been challenged recently in a study2 by Dr. James Diamond, a diplomate of the American Board of Surgery, and Chief
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of head and neck Surgery at
St. Joseph's Hospital, Reading,
P ennsylvania. Diamond argues
t hat any killing of unborn human
life can be considered homicidal
only if the killing took place at or
beyond implantation. Acts which
kill human fertilized ova prior to
implantation may be immoral,
Diamond allows, b u t he t hinks
t hat such acts should be named
anti-conceptive rather than homicidal. Diamond's argument is
based on t wo claims. The first
stipulates that biological information alone provides t he substrate
for all moral and legal thinking
about when a new home truly
comes into being, t hus, for all
moral and legal thinking about
when killing the unborn becomes
homicidal. The second is his claim
that the biological facts about
early human life clearly show that
life existing prior to implantation
cannot reasonably be understood
as an actual or possible subject
of homicidal action.
Diamond's study is especially
significant for pro-lifers because
his sentiments obviously are with
the anti-abortionists, in the current abortion controversy, and
his argument is addressed specifically to those in the pro-life
movement who support the adoption of a constitutional amendment that gives equal protection
against unjustified killing to all
human life from fertilization onward. There has been support for
the position Diamond takes on
the beginning of human life
among some theological ethicists,3
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but their opinions generally tend
to support t he position's plausibility, not its compellingness. Diamond, however, argues from his
position on t he beginning of human life to the definite wrongheadedness of those who seek
t he adoption of a constitutional
amendment that gives equal protection t o all human life from
fertilization onward. I n Diamond's view the biological data
on the vital activity and totipot entiality of human zygotes along
with facts about t he relatively
large numbers of blighted ova
which abort spontaneously shortly after fertilization clearly tips
the scale and shows t he unreasonableness in the claim that the
killing of unborn human life prior
to implantation is homicidal. 4
To admit that t he killing of
early unborn human life is contraceptive rather than homicidal
implies significant practical consequences for amendment seeking
pro-lifers. It would not be a trivial concession. As pro-abortionists
have maintained all along, surgical procedures, mechanical devices, and chemicals currently
used to kill fertilized ova would
then be properly understood as
anti-implantation agents rather
than abortifacients. In addition
to this, it is surely plausible to
presume, if an amendment were
adopted which protected the lives
of only the unborn who had
achieved implantation, large efforts would be made to develop
better techniques both for detecting the presence of young unborn
life and for preventing its imLinacre Quarterly

plantation. Moreover, the admission would surely deny a basic
moral objection to "in vitro" fertilization research experiments,
namely, that no human subject
from fertilization onward may be
treated as a means alone. The
critical question for the pro-lifer
under discussion, then, is whether
or not Diamond's argument is
sufficiently compelling to cause
him to change his mind about
when a bona fide homo begins to
be.
Restructuring the Argument
Before considering the question
directly some excising must be
performed on Diamond's argument and some reconstruction of
it made. First, concerning the excising, it is appropriate to delete
from the argument inferences
which are based upon blighted
ova ; since this fact does not really
challenge the basis for the prolife claim that the killing of human life from fertilization onward
should be considered homicidal.
According to Diamond the na t ural deficiencies in the zygotes
which abort spontaneously shortly after fertilization indicates a
lack in them of an y real capacity
to be truly human. Diamond's interpretation here may be plausible but not at all necessary since
other plausible hypotheses are
also available,6 but that is no t to
the present point. Even if Diamond's interpretation were compelling it establishes no necessary
connection between the blighted
ova and the pro-life concept of
human life drawn from adult humans, because no human adult
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comes from a blighted ova. If
Diamond's interpretation were
recognized by the pro-lifer the
latter could continue supporting
his position by simply admitting
to at least two different kinds of
entities among human zygotes,
those which exist through a basic
tendential existential principle of
human life and those which do
no t. And this admission warrants
no change in the judgment that
killing fertilized ova is a homicidal action. Since the truly human zygotes are indistinguishable
from the others, a point incidentally that Diamond implicitly
accepts,7 it is the safer and obligatory course from both the
moral and legal points of view, at
least in matters of life and death,
. to t reat all zygotes as if they
existed through the basic principle.
Some reconstruction of Diamond's argument is required
because whatever challenge it
presents to an amendment-seeker
comes from biological evidence
about vital activity and totipotentiality and not from his stipulation about the primacy of biology for all moral and legal
thinking about the homicidal
character of the killing of unborn
human life.8 As far as I can discern Diamond offers no good
reason for accepting the stipulation, while there does exist, I believe, much good reason for rejecting it. The disvalue in any
indisputed instance of homicide
surely does not reduce to a loss
of biological life. That loss is part
of the disvalue, but the total dis87

value also includes a loss from
this world of many other discernible perspectives of human
life, the specifically personal aspects of knowing and loving for
example. In fact many pro-abortionists 9 in focusing upon one or
another of these discernible aspects (psychological or interpersonal, for example) have, in
effect, replaced Diamond's preferred biological substrate with
their own partial perspective and
equally arbitrary stipulation.
This I believe indicates the
propriety in approaching the
question of homicide and the killing of the unborn through a well
developed philosophical concept
of human life derived from adult
human life rather than through a
construct derived from factual information about early human
zygotes, which is the approach
Diamond takes. As illustrated in
the existential concept of human
life outlined earlier in the paper,
a plausible philosophical concept
is complete. It excludes nothing
significant to the homicide question from other legitimate partial
perspectives, such as biology or
psychology, but also includes basic aspects (e.g., intrinsic tendential principle of human life)
incapable of being manifested in
other perspectives. Nothing from
the other perspectives is excluded
because a philosophical concept
is rendered implausible and invalid in so far as it conflicts with,
and cannot accommodate, data
about human life proper to any
legitimate partial perspectiv~ .
Reinhold Niebuhr has put this
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validating point succinctly in explaining how experience can invalidate presuppositions held by
faith.
Guiding presuppositions do indeed
color the evidence accumulated by
experience. Presuppositions are like
s pectacles worn by a nearsighted
or myopic man. He cannot see
without his spectacles. But if evi·
dence other than that gathered by
his sight persuades him that his
spectacles are inadequate to help
him see what he ought to see, he
will change his spectacles. lD

The basic challenge Diamond
advances really comes to this: the
biological data about the early
zygote's vital activity and totipotentiality simply renders implausible any philosophical concept of
human life which allows the killing of early unborn human life to
be considered homicidal. And the
specific challenge he raises for
amendment-seeking pro -1 if e r s,
whose position rests upon a philosophical concept of human life
outlined at the beginning of the
paper, is whether or not applying
their concept to fertilized ova
conflicts with the nature of the
vital activity and totipotentiality
present in early human zygotes. I I
If there is substantial conflict
then the application of the concept to fertilized ova, if not the
very concept itself, is rendered
invalid. If, however, the pro-life
concept can adequately accommodate these biological facts, Diamond's objection will be met and
his challenge will be null.
The basic biological fact about
the vital activity of the early
Linacre Quarterly

zygote is that the zygote sustains
itself through a self-cannibalization process, 12 similar to the nutrient process in sperm and fertilized ova. Furthermore the intrinsic supply of nutrients in
these zygotes becomes exhausted
at about the same time their
cardiocirculatory system becomes
functional. The extrinsic source
of nutritive supply, necessary for
their continued survival, then, is
delivered when and if the zygote
achieves a successful implantation, 1.l and the embryo makes a
functional entry into the maternal circulatory system. Other biological changes similar to this are
also operative in early zygotes.
The directedness of the zygote's
internal activity, for example, is
a maternal donation initially, and
it is only at some later time that
it elaborates its own RNA.1 4
These kinds of changes, according to Diamond, indicates clearly
that the early fertilizatum is not
yet a genuine human entity that
could be the subject of homicide
in a moral or legal sense. Rather,
he continues, "it is defined most
accurately as intervital (like that
of sperm and ovum) and either
pre-organismal or inter-organismal."l; Although Diamond's construct explaining these facts also
may be plausible it is not a compelling hypothesis; for the facts,
in themselves, do not imply any
conflict with the amendmentseekers' concept of human life
rooted in a tendential principle.
Perhaps a conflict would exist if
something completely novel appeared in the zygote when its
May, 1976

nutritive process changed or
when it became directed through
RNA instead of a "maternal donation." If that were the case it
might be implausible to maintain
that the same existential entity
was subtending the changes. But
nothing completely novel is indicated. On the contrary, the facts
suggest that a capacity to receive
an external nutritive supply arises
from within the zygote, and the
facts do not deny that both the
" maternal donation" and the
RNA are grounded in a tendential principle of human life which
makes it exist, and exist with an
orientation to further human development and completion.
Two Dimensions
There are two distinct but related dimensions to the biological
facts in Diamond's argument pertaining to the totipotentiality of
the early zygote or morula . First,
each of the cells in the morula
appears capable of differentiating
into any type of subsequent cell
- bone, brain, or blood. Cells do
not become differentiated into
different organ systems until
what is called the primary organizer or primitive streak appears on
the posterior lip of the blastopore. Moreover, if the primary
organizer of one blastula is grafted onto another, further differentiation of the cells in the first
will cease, but differentiation of
the cells in the second will recommence. This, states Diamond,
gives the scientist "an almost insuperable inclination to identify
hominization as being positable
no earlier than the blastocyst
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stage." Ii. T he second dimension
of the biological evidence related
t o t otipotent iality is t he fact t hat
t he biological unity of t he individual zygote is irrevocably established only when t he primary
organizer appears on t he blastocyst. From t hat time onward
neither t winning nor t he reconjunction of a twinn ed or split
morula can possibly occur. " But
since twi nning and reconjunction
may occur anytime prior to t he
appearance of t he primary organizer l ~ Diamond contends "we
can justifiably hold t hat at fert ilization is laid down only the
character of the subsequentl y
hominizable entity (ies), t he hominization and individuation of
which cannot be posited until the
late-second or early-third week
after fe rtilization."19
Contrary to Diamond's opinion
t he facts in both of t hese dimensions do not invalidate t he
amendment-seeker's m 0 ve in
which he applies his concept of
h uman life t o fertilized ova. Concerning t he first dimension, t he
t ransition which takes place between the undifferentiated cells
in the morula and the cells in the
blastula which a re u ndergoing
differentiation can be explaned in
t he following way. The basic
t endential act making t he fert ilized ovum a human being requires a defin ite amount of initial
cell matter in order for the specific organ systems in the zygote
t o develop. Once sufficient cell
matter becomes available, the
basic tendency's orientation to
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develop the vegetative structure
of t he zygote's human life becomes operative. T he primary organizer is t hen formed and begins
to function, and t he vegetative
s tructure in the unborn begins to
develop as the process of specific
differentiation continues. T his
interpretation is given substant ive empirical validation from the
act t ha t the primary organizer
appears t o develop and form
within t he zygote. I n like manner, it is not difficult to use t he
amendment-seeker's concept for
explaining what occurs when a
primary organizer is taken from
on e blastula and grafted upon another one. T he organizer is simply
understood as a facto r or condi·
tion, rooted in t he basic tendency
yet necessary for its continued
fulfillment, t ha t is also t ransplantable from one blastula to
another. T hus t he organizer is
similar to t he cornea of the eyeball. It t oo is a n ecessary condition for seeing and also capable
of being transplanted from one
eyeball to another.
I n moving to consider the facts
in t he other dimension of totipotentiality reconjunction offers litt le difficulty, given our present
k nowledge of the human zygote,
and may be deleted from Diamond's argument for much t he
same reasons which permit deleting t he fact of blighted ova from
it. So few human adults can be
t raced back to alleged reconjoined zygotes t hat virtually no
substantial relation bet wee n
reconjoined zygotes and adult huLinacre Quarterly

mans has yet been established.
To claim that the successful experiments involvin g reconjoined
lower morulae e.g. mice) establishes tha t relation is also unwarranted, since there is n o guarantee
tha t biological facts pertaining to
morulae in lower animals will no t
conflict with what does or does
not occur in h uman zygot es. The
same rubella virus which crosses
the placenta and infects the fetus
in pregnant. women, for example,
does not cross the placenta in
pregnan . monkeys.zn E ven if the
relation between cert ain huma
ad ul t s an d reconjoined zygotes
had been established it woul d
warrant no change in the amendment-seeker's position on the rela tion between homicide an d the
killing of fertilized ova. For this
fact would indica te nothin g abou t
the relation other human adults
have with the fertilized ova from
which they appear t o have developed . Nor would it even den
that the principle of life in th e
adul t and reconjoined zygote was
also presen t in the original fert ilized ovum prior to t winnin g.
It is left to twinnin g, the n, to
be the cri tical eviden ce which
coul d mak e Diamond's argumen t
a serious chall en ge to the amen dment-seeker's position . Certain aspects of twi nning (and an other
set of multiple instances of identical human life ) do give it th e
appearance of being a formidabl e
fact. For it is clear tha t identical
twi ns exist amon g the class of
adul t human beings. It is equall
clear that the fertilization process
to which an y t win is related bio-
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logically invo ves the initial conjunction of one ovum with one
sperma t ozoon. Father Donceel
has put the challenging poin t in
these facts succin ctly, " one human being splitt ing up into two or
more human beings is, metaphysically speaking, hard to take." 21
Donceel's point is well taken.
T o my knowledge there is no argumen t available which can show
the plausibilit of claiming tha t
the basic tendential principle in
both adul members of a set of
iden tical t.wins began in the same
fert ilized ovum . But to allow this
does no t deny that the principle
of one t win may have begun at
fertilization,22 no r does it den
that the basic existential principle of human life in the other
twin may have begun when t winning occurred, i.e. when he firs t
began to exist as an individual
entity. Moreover, twinning in 110
way decreases the plausibility in
the claim tha t the basic principle
of life in any non-i dentical human
adul t began in the fertilized ovum
fro m which that adult developed.
Thus, although twi nning indicates tha t the principle of human
life in some adults canno t be
t raced back to a fertilized ovum,
twinning does no t deny that the
principle exists in each process of
fertilization , nor does it deny tha t
th e principl e was p resen t when
a ny human adul t began to exist ,
even if that was at the morula
stage of development. Consequently, twinning does not make
Diamond's argument credible,
and th e amendment-seekers'
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claim that no killing of unborn
human life from fertilization onward has not been invalidated
by it.
As a final point it should be
mentioned that, although amendment-seekers can ad e qua tel y
meet Diamond's objection to
their position, it is probably unrealistic to deny the political
difficulty, if not practical impossibility, of having an amendment
passed which would protect the
life of the unborn from fertilization onward. Perhaps in the United States today the best pro-lifers
can realistically expect is the establishment of an amendment
glvmg the unborn protection
against unjust homicides from
the end of the first trimester onward. If this is the case, then,
the establishment of such an
amendment should be understood
only as a political legislative action, and not as a morally justified one. Moreover, pro-lifers who
actively support the passage of
this kind of amendment, because
it is the least evil moral alternative really available in the political order, should make it
perfectly clear that the base for
their support is political rather
than moral. Otherwise their support for an amendment which
may be morally excusable, since
it is the least evil of the feasible
political alternatives, could readily be interpreted as support for
an amendment having moral justification. That would be false
and, in the long run, counterproductive to the moral life of the
community.
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